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Abstract
Over and over again, history shows that countries default on external debt
when their economies experience a downturn. This paper presents a theoretical
model of international lending that is consistent with this evidence. Productivity
is stochastic and international capital markets are incomplete in two ways: the
only internationally traded assets are non-contingent real bonds and borrowers
cannot commit to repay loans. Low productivity realizations get carried forward
through low investment that lower output and consumption and eventually result
in self-fulfilling or solvency debt crises. When lenders are atomistic, self-fulfilling
crises may arise for intermediate debt levels that would not trigger a default with
a large lender. Alternative reforms to eliminate liquidity crises are analyzed.
An international lender of last resort can eliminate liquidity crises provided it
implements full bailouts via purchasing debt at its market price.
JEL Classification Code: F3, F34
Keywords: Sovereign debt, Default, Self-fulfilling crises.
1 Introduction
The history of international lending shows that, time and time again, countries that
borrow internationally are asked to repay when their economies are in a recession.
Countries are asked to cut consumption and investment in order to repay their inter-
national loans exactly when they would like to borrow from abroad. In most cases, the
borrowing country is a small open economy whose idiosyncratic shocks are unlikely to
affect world economic conditions.
∗I thank Peter Kenen for useful discussions on this paper.
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The recent experience of Argentina is an example but other countries had similar
experiences. Mexico defaulted on its external debt in 1983 and in 1995; both default
episodes were preceded by economic deterioration and sharp reversal of economic flows.
Chile, Brazil and Turkey also defaulted on their external debt in the early 1980s after
their economies experienced severe downturns.
Lending models with complete markets do not match this empirical regularity. If
markets are complete, i.e. state-contingent borrowing is feasible, and the government
can commit to repay its debts, default arises in bad economic times but at very high
levels of debt – much higher than those we see in the data. If markets are complete but
the government cannot commit to repay its debts and default is punished by subsequent
exclusion from international borrowing and lending, the incentive to default is strongest
in good economic times. The empirical evidence suggest the opposite.
Before World War II, international lending took mostly the form of bond lending.1
In the early postwar years, however, bond finance dried up and bank loans became
widespread between 1974 and 1982. Loans from relatively few commercial banks rep-
resented most of the emerging economies’ borrowing in the 1970s and resulted in the
debt crisis of the early 1980s. Most of these defaults were solvency crises, character-
ized by high net external debt to GDP ratio. As a counterpart to that, some U.S. and
European banks had exposures exceeding 50 percent in that crisis.
The defaults of the 1980s prompted the international capital markets to partly
switch back from bank loans to bonds. An increasing number of emerging economies
now borrow from the international capital market by issuing bonds again. For example,
bond issues in Latin America grew from less than 1 billion US$ in 1989 to 11.17 billion
US$ in 1993 (see Cline [7]). This impressive growth of bond capital flows stands in
sharp contrast with the stagnation of new long-term loans from the commercial banks,
which fell from 1.92 to 0.53 billion US$ over the same period in Latin America. Figure
1 shows bond capital flows and loans from commercial banks for 8 Latin American
countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
Even ignoring the large jump in 1989, due to the conversion of restructured bank loans
into Brady bonds, the trend is evident.
The change in the composition of international capital lending has been accompa-
nied by the occurrence of sudden reversals of capital flows and defaults. The Mexican
crisis of 1994-95 is an example. To reduce the cost of financing the deficit and preserve
investor confidence, in 1994 the Mexican authorities replaced domestic-interest-based
cetes with dollar-indexed tesobonos, all with maturities of less than a year. Even
though net external debt for Mexico was only 25% of GDP, the bunching of its maturi-
ties and the fact that the outstanding stock of tesobonos exceeded gross international
1Lindert and Morton [19] analyze the historical record of bond lending and find that, on the whole,
it has given a higher real rate of return than the alternative of lending to domestic governments.
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Figure 1: Latin America: composition of external debt as % of GDP
reserves by the end of 1994, led to default.
The problem that arises with bond financing and spread ownership is the debtor’s
exposure to liquidity crises. In solvency crises, like those of the 1980s, the debtor would
not repay its outstanding debt even if it could be rolled over; in liquidity crises, like
the Mexican default of 1994-95, the debtor would repay the outstanding debt if new
debt could be issued.
This paper provides a theoretical framework that sqaures with the evidence de-
scribed above. In this model, international capital markets are incomplete because
borrowing can only occur via issuing bonds that promise a fixed repayment, indepen-
dent of what state of the world occurs. Hence, international loan contracts and their
repayments cannot be made state-contingent. At the same time, borrowers cannot
commit to repay their loans so lenders are reluctant to extend credit beyond what they
expect the borrower will have an incentive to repay. And when lenders are atomistic,
as it may be the case with bond ownership, foreign lenders may refuse to roll over the
debt even at relatively low levels. Most importantly, external credit dries up when the
debtor country is experiencing low growth or is in a recession – which is exactly when
it would like to borrow more.
The recent financial crises in emerging market economies have been costly for the
countries that were at the center of the crises as well as the countries affected by the
spillovers of the crises. The question of how to avoid liquidity crises and how to solve a
crisis in an orderly manner, once it arises, are at the heart of the proposals to reform the
international financial architecture. This paper takes a first step in this direction. Its
framework allows studying policies and reforms to eliminate liquidity crises and assess
their welfare consequences. I consider one of the proposals that has received most
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attention so far: the creation of an international lender of last resort. It turns out
that an international lender of last resort can eliminate liquidity crises and implement
the constrained efficient allocation (given that markets are incomplete) provided it
implements full bailouts via purchasing debt at its market price. By full bailout I mean
that the international lender of last resort should not extend the minimum amount of
credit that barely avoids the crisis, but should lend the amount that the borrower was
seeking to borrow from the international capital market. By fair price I mean that the
price at which the international lender of last resort should purchase debt must be the
market price, which reflects the risk of a solvency crisis. If debt is purchased at a price
higher than its market value, a moral hazard problem arises and an inefficient amount
of borrowing takes place in equilibrium.
The existing literature on sovereign debt and default is large; an excellent review
of this literature is given by Eaton and Fernandez [10]. Eaton and Gersowitz [11] were
the first to look at international lending without commitment to repay and find that
borrowing is indeed limited. Bulow and Rogoff [4] study the case where a government
can safely invest abroad regardless of any past default; they find that international
lending must be supported by direct sanctions, as a country’s reputation for repayment
would not support any borrowing. My work assumes that default is punished by
permanent exclusion from borrowing and lending. The history of international lending
shows that partial repayments often follow default. Fernandez and Rosenthal [13]
study debt renegotiations between a sovereign government and a large creditor. In
my setting borrowing occurs by issuing bonds to a large number of atomistic lenders;
and the problem with bonds, as pointed out by the literature on the new international
financial architecture, is that debt renegotiation may be difficult, if not impossible,
when bond ownership is spread.
Atkeson [1] presents a model of international lending with a moral hazard problem
in investment. He shows that the borrowing country experiences a capital outflow when
the worst output realization takes place. This occurs because of the unobservability
of investment. In my paper there is perfect information and the reason why credit is
withdrawn during economic downturns is because the incentive to repay is low in such
contingencies and debt contracts are not state contingent.
Cole and Kehoe [8] have a model of self-fulfilling debt crises where consumers are
risk-averse with respect to public consumption.2 They characterize the optimal policy
response of the government to the threat of a liquidity crisis, which consists in a
reduction of the stock of debt when the country is in the zone where a self-fulfilling
crisis may arise. My framework is more general than that of Cole and Kehoe. I allow
for a production structure with stochastic technology and for risk aversion in private
consumption. It is precisely because agents are risk-averse that a bad productivity
2Self-fulfilling crises are first studied in Obstfeld [21].
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shock motivates borrowing. Moreover, the welfare costs of autarky are well defined in
this setting.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model; section 3
presents the autarkic equilibrium. Section 4 studies the equilibrium when commitment
to repay is not feasible. The emergence of self-fulfilling debt crises is explained in
section 4.1 and section 5 discusses the debt overhang effect and the debt Laffer curve.
Section 6 studies the welfare costs of liquidity crises and 7 discusses institution-based
bailouts. Section 8 concludes by pointing out the directions for future work.
2 The model
Consider a small open economy in discrete time. There is a single good in each period,
which can be either consumed or saved as capital. Production utilizes capital and,
implicitly, inelastically supplied labor. There are three types of agents in this economy:
consumers, foreign lenders and the domestic government.3
There is a continuum with measure one of identical infinitely-lived consumers who
consume, invest and pay taxes to the government; consumers cannot access the inter-
national credit market directly, i.e. they cannot borrow from or lend to foreign agents
or institutions; the government, however, can. This assumption captures some of the
difficulties inherent with international lending. For example, emerging economies often
impose restrictions on private flows of resources in and out of their boundaries; also,
it is hard for lenders to monitor how private individuals use the proceeds of the loans,
but it is easier to monitor a government. Loan repayments cannot be enforced and
internatinal loans are hard to collateralize; in case of default, it is easier to negotiate
partial repayments with a government rather than with many small private borrowers.
Since the government is benevolent, it borrows and lends so as to maximize welfare of
the citizens; unlike private consumers, who behave atomistically, the government is a
large agent and behaves strategically, taking into account its decisions’ effects on the
price of debt and on the stock of capital.
The representative consumer has preferences
Ut =
∞∑
s=t
βs−tEtu(cs) (1)
where Et means expectations based on the knowledge available at time t, cs is private
consumption in period s, u(·) is assumed to be continuously differentiable, strictly
concave, and monotonically increasing, and β < 1 is the subjective discount factor. In
every period, consumers own the outcome of production that, after paying taxes, is
3The setup is close to Cole and Kehoe [8], but in a more general framework.
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allocated in consumption and investment. The consumer’s budget constraint is
yt − τt = ct + kt+1 (2)
where yt is production, kt is the consumer’s individual capital stock and τt is the lump-
sum tax paid to the government, all this at time t. A unit of capital is created from a
unit of the consumption good. This implies that the relative price of capital goods in
terms of consumption always equals 1. For simplicity, I assume that capital depreciates
completely after its use. Output is produced using capital and the production function
is
yt = Atk
α
t (3)
where At is a stochastic multiplicative productivity factor. Productivity follows the
simple process
At = A+ ǫt, A > 0, (4)
where ǫt is a i.i.d. shock with mean zero and variance σǫ, distributed over [−ǫ, ǫ] with
probability density function ζ(ǫt). The initial capital stock kt is given.
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There is a domestic government in the economy; the government is benevolent
in the sense that its objective is to maximize the utility of consumers, Ut. Unlike
the private consumers, the government can access the international credit market and
can therefore borrow and lend abroad. Credit markets are incomplete because the
government can only borrow or lend via issuing or purchasing bonds that promise a
fixed repayment, independent of the productivity realization. Hence, international loan
contracts and/or their repayments cannot be made state-contingent. The government
levies a lump-sum tax τt from consumers at time t; τt < 0 is a transfer. In every period,
the government issues new debt bt+1, chooses whether to repay its outstanding debt bt,
by setting zt = 1, or default on it by setting zt = 0, and it chooses the tax τt, subject
to the constraint
qtbt+1 = btzt − τt. (5)
qt is the price of a one-period government bond that pays one unit of the consumption
good in period t+1 if default does not occur. There is no need to impose a constraint
on the government on how much it can borrow in order to avoid Ponzi schemes because,
if the government tries to sell too much debt, the price qt goes to zero. The initial stock
of debt bt is given.
It is assumed that, following default, the government loses access to international
borrowing and lending and keeps the whole amount owed to the creditors. Refrain-
ing from lending abroad is subgame perfect for the defaulting government, as any
4The assumption that shocks are i.i.d. is not crucial for the final results; on the other hand, the
assumption that capital depreciates fully is important. If capital did not depreciate at all, the country
would have a stronger incentive to default with a good productivity shock as autarky would be less
costly with a high capital stock.
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lending could be seized by the creditors who want to recuperate their loans. Perma-
nent exclusion from the international capital market is not entirely realistic and is not
renegotiation-proof; in fact, large (i.e. non-atomistic) lenders are willing to forgive
part of the debt in order to recuperate something and the borrower may be willing
to repay part of the debt in order to regain access to the credit market (see Fernan-
dez and Rosenthal [13]). But with debt ownership spread among a large number of
small lenders, as it is assumed here, coordination problems make renegotiation difficult.
These issues will be discussed in detail later.
There is also a continuum with measure one of identical, infinitely lived foreign
lenders. The individual lender is risk neutral with utility function
Jt =
∞∑
s=t
βs−tEtxs (6)
where xt is the lender’s private consumption. Each lender is endowed with x units of
consumption good in each period, which can be lent or consumed later in the period.
The lender’s budget constraint is
qtBt+1 = Btzt + x− xt. (7)
When deciding how much new debt to buy, the lender faces the constraint
x ≥ qtBt+1. (8)
I am going to assume that x >> Bt+1, ∀t: this is a small open economy whose borrowing
is small relative to the size of the international capital market. Foreign lenders’ behavior
depends on the realization of a sunspot variable φ: if φt = 1, which happens with
probability µ, foreign lenders are optimistic and each one of them believes that all others
will purchase the new debt offering bt+1; if φt = 0, which happens with probability 1−µ,
foreign lenders are pessimistic and believe that the new debt bt+1 will not be purchased.
In equilibrium, foreign lenders’ expectation are fulfilled and the outstanding debt bt is
defaulted when they are pessimistic and foreign debt is high enough.
The market clearing condition for the government’s debt is bt+1 = Bt+1; I assume
that the foreign lenders behave competitively in making their choice of bt+1; consumers
also behave competitively and take next period’s prices and the government’s actions
as given; in equilibrium, all consumers are identical and Kt+1 is the aggregate capital
stock at the beginning of period t+ 1.
The timing of events is as follows: 1) the productivity shock ǫt is realized; 2) the
government, taking the price schedule qt as given, offers bt+1; 3) the sunspot variable
φt is realized; 4) the foreign lenders choose Bt+1; 5) the government decides whether
to default or not (zt = 0 or 1) and chooses the tax τt; 6) consumers decide how much
to consume and to invest, ct and kt+1.
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The timing of bond issue and repayment is fundamental to allow for self-fulfilling
crises. The government issues new debt before it repays the old one; if current produc-
tivity is low and the stock of debt is high enough, foreign lenders’ expectations crucially
determine if default on the outstanding debt will take place. Given the fundamentals,
optimistic lenders anticipate roll-over and no default on the outstanding debt; hence
they purchase the new debt and repayment of the old debt occurs. With exactly the
same fundamentals but pessimistic lenders that anticipate no roll-over, the new debt
is not purchased and the old debt is defaulted. The probability of a crisis is arbitrary
after the productivity shock is realized; ex-ante, the probability of a crisis is higher for
lower productivity realizations.
3 The equilibrium with autarky
First, I study the autarkic equilibrium of this economy – namely, the equilibrium with
no borrowing and lending from the rest of the world; this is the relevant equilibrium
after default. When the economy is barred from international borrowing and lending,
the government has no role and taxes are zero. Consumers choose how much to invest
kt+1 in order to maximize (1) subject to (2); the first order condition is
u′(ct) = βEt
[
u′(ct+1)At+1αk
α−1
t+1
]
, (9)
which shows that the optimal investment decision is such that the marginal disutility
of investing an extra-unit of capital and cutting current consumption must be equal
to the expected marginal increase in future consumption, which depends on future
productivity. The right-hand side of (9) is the expected value of a product and can
therefore be rewritten as
u′(ct) = βEt [u
′(ct+1)]Et[At+1αk
α−1
t+1 ] + Cov(u
′(ct+1), At+1αk
α−1
t+1 ). (10)
The covariance is negative because, when productivity is high, consumption is high
and its marginal utility is low. Investment in domestic capital, which is the only
asset available to citizens for smoothing their consumption, does not provide an edge
against the fluctuations in productivity; as a result, consumers invest on average less
than in an economy where consumption fluctuations can be insured against. Income
is procyclical in this economy and, as a result, investment, income and consumption
are also procyclical. Since consumers are risk-averse, the volatility of consumption
makes them ex-ante worse off in the autarkic equilibrium than in an equilibrium where
consumption fluctuations can be insured away. Given kt, ǫt, the expected utility from
t on in the autarkic equilibrium is
Uat (kt, ǫt) = u(yt − k
a
t+1) +
∞∑
s=t+1
βs−tEtu(ys − k
a
s+1). (11)
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4 The equilibrium without commitment
This section studies the equilibrium when the government cannot commit to repay
its debt. Appendix A studies the equilibrium when commitment to repay is feasible.
Here, it is assumed that default causes: 1) the lender to lose its principal; 2) the
borrower to lose its access to international borrowing and lending forever. I construct a
recursive equilibrium in which commitment is not feasible and agents act sequentially
and rationally. I consider the maximizing choice of the consumers, the maximizing
choice of foreign lenders, and the maximizing choices of the government, which acts
twice in period t: first, it decides how much debt to issue bt+1, then it decides whether
to repudiate the old debt, zt = 0 or 1 (and residually it decides the tax τt).
The definition of equilibrium used here follows the definition of sustainable equilib-
rium of Chari and Kehoe [5], [6] and the definition of credible equilibrium by Stokey
[24]. Appendix B gives the formal definitions.
4.1 Regions with crises: a graphical interpretation
This section gives a graphical intuition of the equilibrium of the model. Figure 2 shows
that there are three regions in the (bt, ǫt) space: a no-default region, a self-fulfilling crises
region, and a default region. Given bt, Kt, once the productivity shock ǫt is realized,
the government knows in which of the three regions it lies and whether it is vulnerable
to a crisis. For low levels of outstanding debt, i.e. for bt ≤ b(Kt), the probability of
default is zero. Even if the productivity realization is low, the government prefers to
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repay the outstanding stock of debt rather than defaulting and being excluded from
the international capital market forever. Since bt is low, the cost of repaying is lower
than the expected gains from being able to borrow in the future. Notice that the
no-default region is wider in its upper part: the government is not vulnerable to crises
when productivity is high. Since the probability of default is zero, the new debt bt+1
is purchased with probability one: the international capital market is “perfect” in this
region.
For intermediate levels of debt, i.e. for b(Kt) < bt ≤ b¯(Kt), the government is
vulnerable to self-fulfilling crises. For debt-productivity realizations in this region,
repayment and default are equilibria. If the sunspot variable φt is equal to 1, which
happens with probability µ, foreign lenders purchase the new debt bt+1 sold by the
government that, with these proceeds, repays the outstanding debt bt. If the sunspot
variable φt is equal to zero, which happens with probability 1−µ, foreign lenders do not
purchase the new debt bt+1; unable to roll over the outstanding debt, the government
should levy high taxes to repay it and prefers to default. Notice that repayment and
default arise with the same fundamentals; the only difference is whether foreign lenders
purchase the new debt or not. In the first case, each lender is optimistic and purchases
the new debt as she believes that all other lenders will also do so. In the second case,
each lender is pessimistic and does not purchase the new debt because she believes
that no one else will: if productivity is low enough, failure to sell the new debt triggers
a default on the outstanding debt. This is a self-fulfilling debt crisis. At the heart of
self-fulfilling crises is the atomistic behavior of foreign lenders. One large lender, or
few of them, internalizes the government’s need of issuing new debt to repay old debt
and will not cut credit.
The left boundary between the no-default and the self-fulfilling crises region is the
combination of debt levels and productivity realizations such that the government is
indifferent between repaying the outstanding debt bt and defaulting on it when foreign
lenders do not purchase new debt bt+1. These combinations are labelled ǫ
′(bt, Kt) and
they will be defined formally in the next section. ǫ′ is postively sloped because the
goverment needs to levy higher taxes to repay higher leves of bt without issuing any
new debt bt+1; hence, productivity must be higher for the government to be indifferent
between repaying and defaulting.
The right boundary between the self-fulfilling crises and the default region is the
combinations of debt and productivity realizations such that the government is indiffer-
ent between repaying the outstanding debt bt and defaulting on it when foreign lenders
purchase the new debt bt+1. These combinations are labelled ǫ
′′(bt, Kt); this locus is
upward sloping in the (bt, ǫt) space for similar reasons as to why ǫ
′ is upward sloping.
For high debt levels, i.e. for bt > b¯(Kt), there is a solvency crisis and default occurs
with probability one. Here debt is so high and productivity so low that the new debt
bt+1 won’t be purchased because it is worthless as it will be defaulted for sure; hence,
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the government defaults on bt with probability one.
Output fluctuations play an important role in sovereign default. Self-fulfilling and
solvency crises occur both with bad productivity realizations; the former with relatively
low debt levels, the latter with relatively high debt levels.
A higher stock of initial capital Kt makes default less likely by enlarging the no-
default region. More precisely, ǫ′ and ǫ′′ shift downward and to the right. The assump-
tion that capital fully depreciates every period is important for this result. If capital
does not depreciate fully, a high stock of capital makes autarky better and raises the
incentive to default; this must be balanced against a weaker incentive to default coming
from higher output and lower borrowing from the international capital market, i.e. a
low bt+1.
Figure 3 shows the lenders’ price schedule for a given capital stock. These are the
debt price-quantity combinations that foreign lenders are willing to purchase before
the sunspot variable is realized. When the government chooses its new debt offering
bt+1, it takes this price schedule as given and chooses the price-quantity combination
on it that maximizes its utility. Two price schedules are depicted in figure 3. The
most outward curve is for µ = 1, namely when foreign lenders are always optimistic;
the downward sloping section of the curve corresponds to debt levels associated with
positive probabilities that bt+1 > b(kt+1). The most inward curve is for µ = 0, that
corresponds to the case when foreign lenders are always pessimistic; notice that the
government can borrow less and at a lower price relative to the µ = 1 case. The curve
for µ ∈ (0, 1) lies in between these two curves.
The price of the newly issued debt is equal to β for debt levels in the no-default
region (bt+1 < b¯(Kt+1), which are repaid with probability one. For debt levels between
b¯(Kt+1) and b(Kt+1), foreign lenders anticipate repayment with probability strictly less
than one and, to compensate them for the risk of default, the price falls below β.5 The
price schedule is flat at zero for debt levels above b(Kt+1): debts in the default region
are worthless and foreign lenders do not purchase them for a positive price.
4.2 Characterization
Now I characterize the policy functions of each agent in the economy. I start with the
consumers, who are the last the act in each period. Let ǫ′(bt, Kt) be the productivity
realization at t such that, if foreign lenders do not purchase any new debt and set
Bt+1 = 0, the government is indifferent to repay the oustanding debt bt or defaulting
on it. In the notation of appendix B,6 ǫ′ is the productivity realization, given bt and
5Since d2qt/db
2
t+1 < 0, the price schedule is convex.
6To keep the notation simple, the dependence of ǫ′, ǫ′′ on bt,Kt will be dropped whenever it does
not create confusion.
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Kt, that defines the aggregate state s
′
t = (Bt, Kt, zt−1, ǫ
′
t) such that
V n(s′t, 0, qt) = V
d(s′t, 0, qt),
where d stands for default, n stands for no-default and V i, i = n, d is the value function
in the case of no-default or default, respectively. Intuitively, failure to sell new debt
when productivity is low, namely ǫt < ǫ
′, means that the government chooses to default
rather than repay, thereby fulfilling the lenders’ expectations. To honor the outstanding
debt without issuing any new lending, the government must raise taxes τt = bt and
reduce current consumption proportionally; if current output is low because of low
capital and/or a low productivity realization, default may be a better option.
Similarly, let ǫ′′(bt, Kt) be the productivity realization at t such that, if foreign
lenders purchase the new debt issued by the government and set Bt+1 = bt+1, the
government is indifferent to repay the oustanding debt bt or defaulting on it. In the
notation of appendix B, ǫ′′ is the productivity realization, given bt and Kt, that defines
the aggregate state s′′t = (Bt, Kt, zt−1, ǫ
′′
t ) such that
V n(s′′t , bt+1, qt) = V
d(s′′t , bt+1, qt).
Intuitively, the government’s participation constraint is binding at ǫ′′; for productivity
realizations lower than ǫ′′, a solvency crisis occurs and the government defaults even if
foreign lenders purchase the new debt. Of course, foreign lenders anticipate the default
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and, in equilibrium, do not purchase any new debt when ǫt < ǫ
′′. Appendix D proves
ǫ′ > ǫ′′; appendix C proves that
dǫ′
dbt
> 0,
dǫ′
dKt
< 0,
dǫ′′
dbt
> 0,
dǫ′′
dKt
< 0.
Given the definitions above, the probability at the beginning of period t that the
outstanding stock of debt bt will be repaid later on in the period is given by
(1− µ)
∫ ǫ
ǫ′
ζ(ǫt)dǫt + µ
∫ ǫ
ǫ′′
ζ(ǫt)dǫt. (12)
The first term on the right-hand side is the probability that the sunspot variable
φt will take value 0 and the productivity realization will be sufficiently high for the
government to be better off repaying the whole outstanding debt even without a roll
over; the second term is the probability that φt will take value 1 and the government
participation constraint will not be binding.
If default has not occurred at time t−1, the choices of consumption and investment
solve the following problem
max
kt+1
u(ct) + β
[
(1− µ)
∫ ǫ
ǫ′
u(cnt+1)ζ(ǫt+1)dǫt+1 + µ
∫ ǫ
ǫ′′
u(cdt+1)ζ(ǫt+1)dǫt+1
]
(13)
subject to
ct = yt − τt − kt+1
cnt+1 = yt+1 − τt+1 − k
n
t+2
cdt+1 = yt+1 − k
d
t+2
where cnt+1 and c
d
t+1 are consumption in period t+1 contingent on the government not
defaulting and defaulting, respectively, in period t + 1. The first-order condition for
the problem is
u′(ct) = β
[
(1− µ)
∫ ǫ
ǫ′
u′(cnt+1)(A+ ǫt+1)αk
α−1
t+1 ζ(ǫt+1)dǫt+1+ (14)
µ
∫ ǫ
ǫ′′
u′(cnt+1)(A+ ǫt+1)αk
α−1
t+1 ζ(ǫt+1)dǫt+1 + (1− µ)
∫ ǫ′
−ǫ
u′(cdt+1)(A+ ǫt+1)αk
α−1
t+1 ζ(ǫt+1)dǫt+1
+µ
∫ ǫ′′
−ǫ
u′(cdt+1)(A+ ǫt+1)αk
α−1
t+1 ζ(ǫt+1)dǫt+1
]
.
If the probability of default is high, investment is mainly determined according to the
autarkic solution; if the probability of default is low, investment resembles more the
solution with borrowing.
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Foreign lenders are atomistic agents that behave competitively but not strategically;
more precisely, they do not internalize the effect of their individual actions on the
aggregate state. Given the aggregate state st and the new debt offering bt+1, the
foreign lenders choose whether to purchase it or not. If they decide to purchase the
new debt, then bt+1 = Bt+1. The first-order condition for the problem in (B.13) defines
the price at which foreign lenders purchase the debt
qt = β
[
(1− µ)
∫ ǫ
ǫ′
ζ(ǫt+1)dǫt+1 + µ
∫ ǫ
ǫ′′
ζ(ǫt+1)dǫt+1
]
. (15)
Foreign lenders are atomistic and each one of them takes the above expression para-
metrically. They will purchase new debt at the price qt, which compensates them for
the future risk of default; equation (15) implicitly defines the lenders’ supply schedule.
Notice that competition among foreign lenders drives the price down to qt.
Consider now the government’s decisions. First, the government chooses the new
debt offering subject to the lenders’ supply schedule (15). At this stage, the government
knows the aggregate state st, which implies that the probability of default on the
outstanding debt bt is completely exogenous. In other words, given bt, Kt and ǫt,
the government is or is not in the self-fulfilling crises region; it defaults on bt with
probability 1− µ, i.e. if the sunspot variable φt = 0, if it is in the self-fulfilling region;
if, given bt, Kt and ǫt, the government is in the default region, its choice of bt+1 does not
matter because foreign lenders will not purchase it for a positive price. This implies
that the choice of zt is not affected by bt+1 (the best the government can do, once it
is in the self-fulfilling crises region, is to sell the optimal amount of debt) and we only
need to study the choice of bt+1 when zt = 1 and bt is repaid. Formally, the government
solves the problem
V n(st) = max
bt+1
u(cnt ) + β
[
(1− µ)
∫ ǫ
ǫ′
V n(st+1)ζ(ǫt+1)dǫt+1 + µ
∫ ǫ
ǫ′′
V n(st+1)ζ(ǫt+1)dǫt+1
+(1− µ)
∫ ǫ′
−ǫ
V d(st+1)ζ(ǫt+1)dǫt+1 + µ
∫ ǫ′′
−ǫ
V d(st+1)ζ(ǫt+1)dǫt+1
]
. (16)
subject to
ct = yt − kt+1 + qtbt+1 − bt
where V n(st+1) is the payoff to the government conditional on not defaulting in period
t+ 1 and V d(st+1) is the payoff to the government conditional on defaulting in period
t + 1 (and therefore equal to Ua(kt+1, ǫt+1) defined in (11)). The first-order condition
for the problem is
u′(cnt )qt [1 + ηt+1] = β
[
(1− µ)
∫ ǫ
ǫ′
u′(cnt+1)(1 + ηt+2)ζ(ǫt+1)dǫt+1 (17)
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+µ
∫ ǫ
ǫ′′
u′(cnt+1)(1 + ηt+2)ζ(ǫt+1)dǫt+1
]
where ηt+1 ≡ (∂qt/∂bt+1)/(bt+1/qt) is the price elasticity of the demand for bt+1 that,
as shown in figure 3, is negative when bt+1 is high enough to make the government
vulnerable to self-fulfilling crises.7 A small increase in bt+1 raises current consumption
by reducing the current tax by qt(1 + ηt+1); however, a higher bt+1, if repaid, means
higher taxes and lower consumption in period t + 1. Moreover, the higher the debt
issued today, the higher the debt issued tomorrow and, therefore, the lower the price
that the government will receive for it. The first-order condition (17) has a very simple
interpretation when the government is in the no-default region today and will be, with
probability one, in the no-default region tomorrow. In this case, ηt+1 = ηt+2 = 0, qt =
1, ǫ′ < −ǫ, ǫ′′ < −ǫ. When the government is in the self-fulfilling crises region, it
balances two incentives: to smooth consumption over time (raise debt when a bad
shock hits) and to reduce debt to exit the self-fulfilling crises region (lower debt means
higher price).8
Later on in the same period, the government decides whether to repay or default
the stock of old debt (zt = 1 or 0) and levies a lump-sum tax on consumers τt, whose
amount is uniquely defined by the government budget constraint. Given the aggregate
state st, the amount of new debt purchased by the foreign lenders Bt+1 and the price at
which it was sold qt, the government repays bt if its participation constraint is satisfied,
namely
V n(st, Bt+1, qt) ≥ V
d(st, Bt+1, qt),
where
V n(st, Bt+1, qt) = u(yt − τt − kt+1) + βEt
[
(1− µ)
∫ ǫ
ǫ′
V n(st+1)ζ(ǫt+1)dǫt+1+ (18)
µ
∫ ǫ
ǫ′′
V n(st+1)ζ(ǫt+1)dǫt+1 + (1− µ)
∫ ǫ′
−ǫ
V d(st+1)ζ(ǫt+1)dǫt+1 + µ
∫ ǫ′′
−ǫ
V d(st+1)ζ(ǫt+1)dǫt+1
]
.
and V d(st, Bt+1, qt) given by (11). In words, the government honors its outstanding
debt only if it has the incentive to do so.
7More precisely,
dqt
dbt+1
= −β
[
(1− µ)
dǫ′
dbt+1
+ µ
dǫ′′
dbt+1
]
≤ 0.
8Notice that bt+1 affects current investment via its effect on current taxes; thanks to the envelope
theorem and the fact that consumers optimally allocate each extra unit of after-tax income between
consumption and investment, this effect drops out of (17).
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5 Debt overhang and the debt Laffer curve
It is often argued that large external debt is the cause of growth slowdown in a debtor
country because its legacy effectively taxes available resources and reduces investment.
Many developing countries in the 1980s saw their investment figures fall precipitously
as the debt crisis developed and foreign credit almost disappeared. This question can
be addressed precisely within the model developed so far. Conditional on zt+1 = 1,
totally differentiating the first-order condition (14), I find that
dknt+1
dbt
=
−u′′(cnt )
Ω
< 0, (19)
where Ω < 0.9 This is the debt overhang effect on the debtor’s investment: inherited
liabilities, if repaid, reduce capital in the debtor country. On the other hand
dkt+1
dbt+1
=
1
Ω
{
u′′(ct)[qt + bt+1
dqt
dbt+1
− bt
dzt
dbt+1
] + µ
∫ ǫ
ǫ′′
u′′(cnt+1)ζ(ǫt+1)dǫt+1
+(1− µ)
∫ ǫ
ǫ′
u′′(cnt+1)ζ(ǫt+1)dǫt+1
}
> 0. (20)
This is the investment effect of new debt: new credit lowers current taxes and raises
current investment.
The current initiative to extend debt relief to heavily indebted poor countries
(HIPC) as well as the initiative to partially forgive the debt of some nations in the
1980s are based on the idea that, when debt is too high, the debt overhang problem is
so severe that forgiving a portion of the debt raises expected debt repayment. In other
words, the value of the debt increases by forgiving some debt. This concept has been
labeled the debt Laffer curve, by analogy with the usual tax Laffer curve that shows
that tax revenues may fall as the tax is raised. The context within which Krugman [17]
9More precisely,
Ω = u′′(ct) + βEt
[
(1− µ)
∫ ǫ
ǫ′
u′′(cnt+1)(At+1αk
α−1
t+1 )
2 + µ
∫ ǫ
ǫ′′
u′′(cnt+1)(At+1αk
α−1
t+1 )
2+
(1 − µ)
∫
ǫ
ǫ′
u′(cn
t+1)At+1α(α− 1)k
α−2
t+1 + µ
∫
ǫ
ǫ′′
u′(cn
t+1)At+1α(α − 1)k
α−2
t+1
]
+β
[
(1− µ)
∫ ǫ′
−ǫ
u′′(cdt+1)(At+1αk
α−1
t+1 )
2 + µ
∫ ǫ′′
−ǫ
u′′(cdt+1)(At+1αk
α−1
t+1 )
2
+(1− µ)
∫ ǫ′
−ǫ
u′(cdt+1)At+1α(α− 1)k
α−2
t+1 + µ
∫ ǫ′′
−ǫ
u′(cdt+1)At+1α(α − 1)k
α−2
t+1
]
< 0.
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and Sachs [22] developed the debt Laffer curve is one where creditors can seize part of
the country’s output in case of a default.
The concept of debt Laffer curve can be investigated in this setting. The face value
of the stock of debt is bt+1; let W (bt+1) be the market value of the debt as defined by
W (bt+1) = bt+1
[
µ
∫ ǫ
ǫ′′
ζ(ǫt+1)dǫt+1 + (1− µ)
∫ ǫ
ǫ′
ζ(ǫt+1)dǫt+1
]
, (21)
for debt levels above b(Kt+1), i.e. in the default region, the market value is zero. The
market value of the debt W (bt+1) is plotted in figure 4 for µ > 0. To understand why
it is inverse-U shaped, consider its differentiation with respect to bt+1:
dW
dbt+1
= µ
∫ ǫ
ǫ′′
ζ(ǫt+1)dǫt+1 + (1− µ)
∫ ǫ
ǫ′
ζ(ǫt+1)dǫt+1 − bt+1
[
µ
dǫ′′
dbt+1
+ (1− µ)
dǫ′
dbt+1
]
.
(22)
The first two terms on the right-hand side are the probability of repayment; the third
term on the right-hand side is the (negative) effect of higher debt on the probability of
repayment. For debt levels in the no-default region, the debt is repaid with probability
one, the second term is zero10 and the debt Laffer curve is a straight line out of the origin
with slope 1; for debt levels in the self-fulfilling region, a rise in the debt lowers the
probability of repayment and investment and the Laffer curve flattens, and eventually
it slopes downward.
6 Welfare
Defining aggregate welfare in a model with heterogeneous agents raises some obvious
difficulties, especially in this setting where lenders are risk-neutral and debtors are
risk-averse. One possible definition consists in the weighted sum of the utilities of all
agents in the economy:
AWt = [ωJt + (1− ω)Ut] , 0 < ω < 1 (23)
where Jt is the expected utility of the foreign lenders and Ut is the expected utility of
the consumers at the beginning of period t. These utilities have been defined in (1)
and (6).
A benevolent central planner maximizes (23) under the resource constraint of the
lenders and the budget constraint of the consumers. I concentrate on the solution to
this problem where both the lenders and the debtors are fully rational (i.e. where
lenders do not purchase debt that won’t repay at least 1/β in expected terms) and
where there are no ex-post transfers that were not specified in the contracts.
10More precisely, ǫ′ and ǫ′′ /∈ [−ǫ, ǫ].
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Figure 4: Debt Laffer curve
If the benevolent central planner could provide the government with a commitment
device, it would certainly do so because commitment delivers the most efficient allo-
cations. This is equivalent to the benevolent central planner setting up a system of
punishments, possibly very large, following default so that the government will not
default. Here I consider the case where the benevolent planner cannot provide such a
commitment device.
A benevolent central planner solves the coordination failure that is at the heart
of a liquidity crisis if it can eliminate the atomistic behavior of lenders. The planner
recognizes that, if lenders withdraw their credit when productivity is low, the debtor
country may have no option but default; hence, welfare is maximized if any new debt
below b(kt) is purchased at the price
qt = β
∫ ǫ
ǫ′′
ζ(ǫt+1)dǫt+1.
In words, the benevolent central planner implements the decentralized solution when
µ = 1.
In this setting, we can easily measure the welfare costs of liquidity crises. Ex-ante
and before a crisis occurs, the anticipation of a credit withdrawal lowers the price
at which the debtor sells its debt. This is the vertical distance between the price
schedules in figure 3: the lower µ, the more pessimistic the lenders and the lower the
price qt. If lenders could be made more optimistic by endowing them with µ = 1, the
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government borrows more cheaply in bad times and, on average, invests and produces
more. Suppose this economy has been in an equilibrium with µ < 1 until period t− 1
and there has been no default; if this economy switches permanently to µ = 1 at the
very beginning of period t, aggregate welfare increases. At t, Jt increases by
bt(1− µ)
∫ ǫ′
ǫ′′
ζ(ǫt)dǫt ≥ 0. (24)
Repayment of bt is now expected with higher probability. This is a once-and-for-all
effect; the expected utility of lenders after t is unchanged because higher probability
of repayment brings higher debt prices. The change in consumers’ expected utility is
(1− µ)
∫ ǫ′
ǫ′′
[
V n(st+1)− V
d(st+1)
]
ζ(ǫt+1)dǫt+1 > 0. (25)
Intuitively, consumers’ expected utilityimproves because self-fulfilling crises disappear;
this raises qt, which in turn raises current consumption, current investment and future
expected consumption.
7 Bailout
Since liquidity crises impose welfare costs, ex-ante as well as ex-post, it is desirable to
eliminate them. A number of measures have been proposed lately to reduce the risk of
liquidity crises or to solve a liquidity crisis, once it arises, in a more orderly manner.
For example, bailouts, the creation of an international lender of last resort and the
creation of contingent credit lines by the IMF belong to the first category (see Fischer
[14]); debt standstills, debt rollover options and bondholders committees belong to the
second category and their use has been recently suggested by Miller and Zhang [20],
Buiter and Siber [2] and Eichengreen [12], respectively. Jeanne [18] studies the welfare
consequences of these measures within a model where debt repayment is feasible only
if the government enacts a fiscal reform.
This section studies the welfare effects of creating an international lender of last
resort; in this setting, this is equivalent to a bailout organized by an international
institution such as the IMF. Suppose a liquidity crisis occurs at time t. In the setting
developed earlier, an international lender of last resort, the IMF henceforth, intervenes
in the following way: it gets an endowment Tt by levying a tax on foreign lenders and
uses it to purchase all or part of the new debt that the government tried to sell without
success. For simplicity, suppose it is costless for the IMF to levy its endowments on the
lenders; moreover, the IMF pays an expected rate of return of 1/β on them. After the
new debt is purchased by the IMF, the government repays in full to foreign lenders the
amount it initially defaulted on, bt; then the consumers take their investment decision.
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I assume that, while the IMF bailout is taking place, the sovereign government cannot
borrow from anyone else than the IMF. This means that the government cannot sell
debt to foreign lenders directly until it has repaid in full the IMF. Starting from t+ 1,
the IMF is the sole owner of government debt. Once the IMF has been repaid in full,
it pays back what it owes to foreign lenders and the debtor government is allowed to
borrow again directly from the lenders. More formally, the foreign lenders’ resource
constraint in the default period t is
xt = x− Tt + bt (26)
where Tt is the transfer to the IMF at time t. After t and until the bailout comes to
an end, the resource constraint in period s is
xs = x− Ts +Rs, (27)
where Rs is the IMF repayment to foreign lenders at time s, with Ts, Rs ≥ 0. The IMF
maximizes the sum of the expected repayments by the government, ds:
JIMFt =
∞∑
s=t
βs−tEtdszs (28)
subject to the resource constraint at s
qsds+1 +Rs = dszs + Ts. (29)
Here I concentrate on two alternative bailout strategies and rank them in terms of
aggregate welfare. In the first bailout scenario, labeled full bailout, the IMF purchases
all the debt that the countried tried to sell at its market price:
dt+1 = bt+1 and qt = β
∫ ǫ
ǫ′′
ζ(ǫt+1)dǫt+1.
The IMF purchases the debt at the market price when µ = 1. It is easy to see
that the full bailout is efficient and it implements the first-best solution. In fact, the
expected rate of return on the debt purchased during the bailout is 1/β; at the same
time, the expected rate of return on the transfers to the IMF is also 1/β. Hence, all the
transactions carried out in the full bailout can be decentralized. The country’s expected
utility is the same as in a setting where liquidity crises never arise. Moreover, if foreign
lenders anticipate the IMF intervention, they will be indifferent between purchasing
the new debt at its market price and withdrawing their credit, cause a liquidity crisis
and paying transfers to the IMF: the two equilibria have the same expected rate of
return, which is in turn equivalent to the return from consuming their endowment x¯.
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Therefore, the creation of an international lender of last resort eliminates the occurrence
of liquidity crises altogether in this setting.
For the full bailout to be efficient, it is necessary that the IMF purchases the debt
at its market price qt. If dt+1 is purchased at a price above qt, the foreign lenders will
on average take a loss from lending to the government. This implies that the IMF
enters into the picture only for a liquidity, not a solvency a crisis.
The second scenario is the partial bailout: in the period the liquidity crisis arises,
say t, the IMF purchases an amount of debt that is less than what the country originally
tried to sell. More precisely,
dt+1 = gt+1 and qt = β
∫ ǫ
ǫ′′
ζ(ǫt+1)dǫt+1,
where gt+1 is the level of debt that makes the government indifferent between defaulting
and repaying:
V n(st, gt+1, qt) = V
d(st, gt+1, qt).
Since the IMF purchases debt at its market price, the expected rate of return on the
country’s debt is, once again, 1/β; however, the partial bailout reduces the expected
utility of the debtor country because gt+1 < bt+1. Hence, aggregate welfare is lower
under partial than full bailout.
To summarize, an international lender of last resort implementing a full bailout
at market prices maximizes aggregate welfare in the sense of (23) and eliminates self-
fulfilling runs altogether. Solvency crises, on the other hand, are not eliminated and the
probability of their occurrence is reflected in the debt price. Notice that the creation
of a contingent credit line that the debtor country can use in the event of a liquidity
crisis is equivalent to the full bailout provided the interest rate fully reflects the risk of
a solvency crisis: (1 + rt+1) = 1/qt.
Many economists have argued that the creation of an international lender of last
resort creates a moral hazard problem. This problem can be easily analyzed in this
setting. Suppose the IMF bails out the country both under liquidity and solvency crises
by levying taxes on foreign lenders. The country’s debt is sold at the price qt = β even
for debt levels larger than b(Kt+1). In fact, each foreign lender anticipates to be taxed
by the IMF in the event of default, irrespectively of whether she is a debt holder or
not. Hence, she is better off purchasing the debt because that entitles her to a credit
of bt+1 in the event of default.
The moral hazard problem of bailing out a country following a solvency crisis is
presented in figure 5. If the price schedule remains flat at β for debt levels above
b(Kt+1), inefficiently high levels of debt get financed at low interest rates; for debt
levels between b(Kt+1) and b(Kt+1), debt should be purchased at a discount, while it is
not; for debt leves above b(Kt+1), the debt would not be purchased at a positive price
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Figure 5: Moral hazard in bailout
in the efficient allocation. Hence, too much borrowing at too high price takes place in
this equilibrium.
8 Conclusions
I have studied a general equilibrium model with stochastic productivity and incomplete
international lending markets that deliver the following results. First, when foreign
lenders are atomistic, self-fulfilling debt crises can arise for intermediate debt levels.
Second, both self-fulfilling and solvency crises arise when the borrower suffer an adverse
shock. The model appears to be well equipped to explain some features that emerge
from the history of international lending.
This work can be extended in several directions. Under the general conditions and
functional forms assumed here, I have been able to characterize the optimal policies of
the government and consumers but have not solved explicitly for them. In the future,
it would be interesting to choose specific functional forms and random processes that
allow one to solve analytically for the dynamic behavior of debt and capital.
When productivity is persistent, namely ρ > 0, an adverse productivity realization
may reduce output for more than one period. I believe that, given the initial stocks
of debt and capital, a negative productivity realization with ρ > 0 makes self-fulfilling
and/or solvency crises more likely. This is because the government needs to borrow
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more than under the case where the productivity shocks are i.i.d; however, the gov-
ernment restraints itself in part because it is aware that a rising debt makes solvency
and liquidity crises more likely. The opposite intuition holds for a positive productivity
shock.
The debt has been assumed to have maturity of one period. This assumption
has been made for the only purpose of making the analysis simpler. Lengthening the
maturity of debt can reduce the size of the self-fulfilling region but it is not going to
eliminate it. Hence, the qualitative results of the paper should hold true.
Since the model is one of perfect information, foreign lenders know exactly the fun-
damentals and therefore know in which debt region they place the borrowing country.
Along the same lines, an international lender of last resort can distinguish between a
liquidity and a solvency crisis. In reality, such distinction may be hard to know. It
would be interesting to extend the model to a setting with incomplete information and
moral hazard.
The welfare analysis of bailouts has been carried out under the assumption that
there are no costs involved with IMF intervention. The existence of costs, certainly a
more realistic assumption, will not change qualitatively the results.
At last, the model easily allows the study another proposal that has been suggested
within the reform of the international financial architecture: “bailing in”, namely forc-
ing the debt-holders that caused a liquidity crisis to assume some of the losses (if any)
generated by the crisis.
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Appendix
A Borrowing with commitment
Assume the government can commit to repay what it has borrowed and study the
equilibrium when the government can borrow and lend from the international lenders.
Since productivity is stochastic (and if ρ = 0 in (7) the shocks are i.i.d.), we must
account for the possibility that, due to a sequence of bad shocks, the government
issues such a large stock of debt that its price is zero (even if such event may have
a very, very small probability). The counterpart to this is having the transversality
condition satisfied in expected terms. Let’s consider first the foreign lenders. When
commitment is feasible, the lender anticipates full repayment by the borrower. The
optimal lending decision solves the following problem
Jct (bt) = max
bt+1
xt + βEtJ
c
t+1(bt+1) (A.1)
subject to (7) and
qtbt+1 ≤ x. (A.2)
Condition (A.2) arises because the new debt must be purchased before the old debt is
repaid by the government. The first-order condition for the problem is
qt = βEt[zt+1]. (A.3)
The foreign lenders purchase the bonds offered by the government as long as their
expected gross rate of return is at least 1/β. Notice that Etzt+1 captures the probability
that the debt will be repaid; under commitment, this probability is below 1 only to
account for the likelihood that the transversality condition is violated.
The government chooses its borrowing, and thereby its taxes, so as to maximize
the utility of consumers. More precisely, the government solves the following dynamic
programming problem:
V c(Bt) = max
τt
u(ct) + βEtV
c(Bt+1), (A.4)
where a superscript c stands for “commitment”, subject to (5). Notice that we do not
need to impose a no-Ponzi-scheme-condition on the government because, if the govern-
ment issues too much debt, its price simply goes to zero. The first-order condition for
this problem is
u′(ct) = Etu
′(ct+1) +
Cov(u′(ct+1, zt+1)
Et[zt+1]
(A.5)
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where I have used condition (A.3). The new amount debt and therefore the optimal
tax at t satisfy the intertemporal Euler equation amended to take into account the
probability that default from bad luck occurs; the covariance term is positive and gives
the intuitive result that the optimal tax at t is higher than it would be if default had
probability truly equal to zero: the government borrows a little less to avoid default.
To find an analytical solution, I assume that the probability of a sequence of bad
shocks is negligible, hence Etzt+1 = 1; it should be kept in mind, however, that this is
not the exact solution if the productivity shocks are i.i.d. In this case, (A.5) simplifies
as the covariance term disappears, so that the consumer’s marginal rate of substitution
of present for future consumption is equal to the price of future consumption in terms
of present consumption.
Consumers choose how much to consume and to invest knowing what the lump-sum
tax (or transfer) is; by consolidating the representative consumer and the government,
we see that investment in kt+1 satisfies
1
β
= Et[At+1αk
α−1
t+1 ]. (A.6)
Consumers invest up to where the expected marginal returns from capital are equal to
1/β. Under the stochastic process for productivity (4), the following constant level of
capital (and therefore investment) satisfies (A.6)
kt+1 = k
c = [Aαβ]
1
1−α . (A.7)
The actual return from capital and production fluctuate with the productivity realiza-
tions, i.e. production is procyclical and production at t is
yct = (A+ ǫt) [Aαβ]
α
1−α . (A.8)
Unlike the autarkic economy, there is only one source of variability in production - the
productivity shock - because capital is constant here. Given the productivity realization
ǫt, the government levies a lump-sum tax or transfers resources to the consumers so
as to keep their consumption and their investment in capital constant. More precisely,
suppose the initial stock of outstanding debt is bt; current and expected future taxes
depend on the outstanding stock of debt via the constraint
Et
∞∑
s=t
β(s−t)τs = bt, (A.9)
The higher the stock of outstanding debt, the higher current and expected future taxes.
In period t, the optimal tax is
τ ct = (1− β) bt + β{ǫtk
α
t + A[k
α
t − (k
c)α]}. (A.10)
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The optimal tax at t consists of the interests on the initial stock of debt (the first
term on the right-hand side), the stochastic part of output plus output in excess of the
average optimal level (the second term on the right-hand side); for s > t, the second
term simplifies to βǫsk
c, as stock of capital is then equal to its optimal level. Notice
that taxes are procyclical. The current account:
CAt = −bt+1 + bt = −
1− β
β
bt +
τ ct
β
is also procyclical and depends on past productivity shocks via bt. Consumption is
constant; for initial conditions bt and kt, the constant level of consumption is given by
cc = A[(1− β)kαt + β(k
c)α]− (1− β)bt + βǫtk
α
t (A.11)
and its expected value as of time t− 1 is
Et−1c
c = A[(1− β)kαt + β(k
c)α]− (1− β)bt.
The lifetime utility of the representative agent in the open economy with commitment
is
U ct =
1
1− β
u(cc). (A.12)
Given bt, ǫt and kt, consumers’ welfare is higher in the open economy with commitment
than in the autarkic economy if U ct ≥ U
a(kt, ǫt). Several factors affect the welfare
comparison of the two equilibria. First, the outstanding stock of debt raises current
and future taxes in the open economy. Second, consumption variability lowers welfare
in the autarkic economy; on the other hand, there is no uncertainty in consumption
in the open economy with commitment. Third, if the initial level of capital kt is low
in the open economy with commitment, the government borrows to bring capital and
expected production to its optimal level; however, future taxes will be correspondingly
higher. In the autarkic economy, a low initial capital stock implies low investment and
therefore a low expected output tomorrow. Forth, investment is lower on average in
autarky because of (10).
B Equilibrium
In period t, the aggregate state of the economy is st = (Bt, Kt, zt−1, ǫt), with bt = Bt
(market clearing last period) and kt = Kt. The state of each agent consists of the
aggregate state, any individual state variable and any variable that has already been
chosen. Let τ(st, Bt+1, qt, φt), z(st, Bt+1, qt, φt), b(st) be the government policy func-
tions, q(st, bt+1) be the price function and K(st, Bt+1, τt, zt) be function that describes
aggregate capital. Consider the consumers, who are the last to act and know every-
thing that has happened in the period. Their state is defined by kt, st, Bt+1, τt, zt; if the
government defaulted, the economy is in autarky and the consumers solve the problem
described in section 3; otherwise, their value function is defined by
U(kt, st, Bt+1, τt, zt) = max
kt+1,ct
u(ct) + βEtU(kt+1, st+1, Bt+2, τt+1, zt+1)
subject to
ct ≤ (A + ǫt)k
α
t − τt − kt+1
ct, kt+1 ≥ 0.
The consumer policy function are c(kt, st, Bt+1, τt, zt) and k(kt, st, Bt+1, τt, zt).
Consider next the foreign lenders; their state is defined by st, Bt, bt+1 and the
sunspot variable φt; the value function for the foreign lenders is given by
J(st, Bt, bt+1, φt) = max
Bt+1
xt + βEtJ(st+1, Bt+1, bt+2, φt+1) (B.13)
subject to (7), (8) and
Bt+1 ≥ −∆.
The foreign lenders’ policy function is denoted B(st, Bt, bt+1, φt).
Consider now the government decisions. First, the government chooses the new debt
offering when its state is simply st and subject to the lenders’ supply schedule q(st, bt+1).
The government is strategic and takes into account the effect of its decision at this stage
on its own tax-default decisions later in the period, and on the consumption-investment
decision by the consumers. The value function for the government is defined by
V (st) = max
bt+1
u(ct) + βEtV (st+1)
The policy function for the government at this stage is denoted b(st).
Later on in the period, the government decides whether to default on the outstand-
ing stock of debt and, residually via the budget constraint, the tax on consumers. The
policy functions τ(st, bt+1, qt, φt), z(st, bt+1, qt, φt) are the solution to
V (st, Bt+1, qt) = max
τt,zt
u(ct) + βEtV (st+1, Bt+2, qt+1)
subject to (5), with zt = 0 or 1.
The equilibrium is a list of value functions U, J, V for consumers, foreign lenders and
the government; policy functions c, k for consumers, B for foreign lenders, b, τ, z for the
government; a price function q and aggregate capital K such that policy functions are
the solution to the value functions of each respective agent, with K(st, Bt+1, τt, zt) =
k(st, Bt+1, τt, zt) and b ∈ B(st, Bt, bt+1) for all bt+1 such that −∆ ≤ bt+1 ≤ x/q(st, bt+1).
Notice that I have restricted my attention to Markov-equilibrium, so that agents’
future actions can be derived completely by their policy functions.
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C Proof
The proof is as follows. Let
V nǫ ≡
∂V n(st, 0, qt)
∂ǫ
V dǫ ≡
∂V d(st, 0, qt)
∂ǫ
V nb ≡
∂V n(st, 0, qt)
∂b
V db ≡
∂V d(st, 0, qt)
∂b
V nKt ≡
∂V n(st, 0, qt)
∂Kt
V dKt ≡
∂V d(st, 0, qt)
∂Kt
,
where s is the aggregate state and it includes the current productivity shock. Notice
that
dǫ′
dbt
=
V db − V
n
b
V nǫ − V
d
ǫ
> 0
dǫ′
dKt
=
V dKt − V
n
Kt
V nǫ − V
d
ǫ
< 0.
To see that V db − V
n
b > 0, just notice that τt = bt if the government repays the debt
(hence consumption is low) whereas τt = 0 if the government defaults. As for the
denominator, V nǫ = u
′(cnt )K
α
t and V
d
ǫ = u
′(cdt )K
α
t ; given Kt, if Bt+1 = 0, taxes must
necessarily be weakly positive so that cnt ≤ c
d
t which implies that V
n
ǫ ≥ V
d
ǫ . This also
implies that
V dKt − V
n
Kt
= [u′(cdt )− u
′(cnt )]αK
α−1
t < 0.
D Proof
I am going to show that ǫ′(bt, kt) > ǫ
′′(bt, kt). Suppose not; then
V n(s′t, Bt+1, qt) < V
d(s′t, Bt+1, qt) and V
n(s′t, 0, qt) > V
d(s′t, 0, qt). (D.14)
In equilibrium, qt = 0 when bt+1 > b(Kt+1), which implies that V
d(s′t, 0, qt) = V
d(s′t, Bt+1, qt)
and V n(s′t, 0, qt) = V
n(s′t, Bt+1, qt).
References
[1] Atkeson, Andrew: “International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudi-
ation,” Econometrica, Vol. 59, 1991.
[2] Buiter, Willem and Sibert, Anne: “UDROP: A Small Contribution to the New
International Financial Architecture,” mimeo 1999.
[3] Bulow, Jeremy and Kenneth Rogoff: “Cleaning up Thirld World Debt Without
Getting Taken to the Cleaners” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 4, No. 1,
1990.
28
[4] Bulow, Jeremy and Kenneth Rogoff: “Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?”
American Economic Review, Vol. 79, 1989.
[5] Chari, V.V. and Kehoe, Patrick: “Sustainable Plans,” Journal of Political Econ-
omy, Vol. 98, no. 4, 1990.
[6] Chari, V.V. and Kehoe, Patrick: “Sustainable Plans and Mutual Default,” Review
of Economic Studies, Vol. 60, no. 1, 1993.
[7] Cline, William: International Debt Reexamined, Institute for International Eco-
nomics, 1995.
[8] Cole, Harold and Timothy Kehoe: “Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises,” forthcoming Review
of Economic Studies.
[9] Eaton, Jonathan: “Debt Relief and the International Enforcement of Loan Con-
tracts,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1990.
[10] Eaton, Jonathan and Raquel Fernandez: “Sovereign Debt” in Gene Grossman and
Kenneth Rogoff, eds. Handbook of International Economics, Vol. 3, 1995.
[11] Eaton, Jonathan and M. Gersovitz: “Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoret-
ical and Empirical Analysis,” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 48, 1981.
[12] Eichengreen, Barry: Toward a New Financial Architecture, Institute for Interna-
tional Economics, Washington DC, 1999.
[13] Fernandez, Raquel and Robert Rosenthal: “Strategic Models of Sovereign-Debt
Renegotiations,” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 57, 1990.
[14] Fischer, Stanley: “On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort,” IMF
mimeo, 1999.
[15] Kenen, Peter: “Organizing Debt Relief: The Need for a New Institution,” Journal
of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1990.
[16] Kletzer,Kenneth: “Sovereign Debt Renegotiation under Asymmetric Informa-
tion,” in Jacob Frenkel, Michael Dooley and Peter Wickham, eds. Analytical Issues
in Debt, 1989.
[17] Krugman, Paul: “Market-Based Debt-Reduction Schemes,” in Jacob Frenkel,
Michael Dooley and Peter Wickham, eds. Analytical Issues in Debt, 1989.
[18] Jeanne, Olivier: “Sovereign Debt Crises and the Global Financial Architecture,”
mimeo 1999.
29
[19] Lindert, Peter and Peter Morton: “How Sovereign Debt Has Worked,” in
Sachs,Jeffrey D. ed. Developing country debt and economic performance, Volume 1,
The international financial system. National Bureau of Economic Research Project
Report series Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press 1989; 39-106.
[20] Miller, Marcus and Lei Zhang: “Sovereign Liquidity Crises: the Strategic Case for
a Payments Standstill,” mimeo, 1998.
[21] Obstfeld, Maurice: “Rational and Self-Fulfilling Balance of Payments Crises,”
American Economic Review, Vol. 76, 1986.
[22] Sachs, Jeffrey: “The debt overhang of developing countries,” in Guillermo Calvo,
Roland Findlay, Pentti Kouri, and Jorge Braga de Macedo, eds. Debt, stabilization
and development: Essays in memory of Carlos Diaz-Alejandro, 1989.
[23] Sachs, Jeffrey: “A Strategy for Efficient Debt Reduction,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1990.
[24] Stokey, Nancy: “Credible Public Policy,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, Vol. 15, no. 4, 1991.
30
